Markets that run on your students' choices.

Prices nobody chose, falling out of what a room of firms produced between them; auctions, budgets and bargains where the trade-offs are real because the coins are the class's own. Three of these games — Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg — deliberately share one demand curve, so a course can run the same market under three rules and put three different prices on the board.

Or steer a whole economy: students sit on countries' interest-rate committees for eight years, a labelled textbook model turns their votes into unemployment and inflation, and the room's own countries show where the long run stands.

Closing time at the market

A practice run with fictional students. No real classroom or join code is created.

Try an answer on the phone. Lead the lesson from the screen.

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Setting up the room…

  • Up to 600 people

    Closing time at the market

    Buyers and growers submit sealed offers. Reveal the market, then reuse those exact orders under a minimum selling price. Each phone shows its own trade or why it stayed unsold. Compare who benefits, who cannot find a buyer, and why unsold crates are not government purchases.

    Supply and demandPrice controls

  • In pairs · About 30 min · 2 acts

    The stag hunt — one day, two ways to spend it

    A stag needs both of you on the ridge all day and the share that comes home is five suppers. A hare is three, it is yours alone, and you can take one at any point in the day. Neither choice is right by itself: what you should do depends entirely on what you think the person beside you is about to do. Played twice, the second time when being the one who stayed actually costs you four suppers out of an empty larder.

    Coordination problemsRisk dominanceNash equilibrium

  • Up to 600 people · About 11 min

    Ten rounds in the pot

    Ten tokens, ten times. A token you keep is worth one to you; a token in the pot is worth half a token to every single person in the room. The pot is better off the more goes in and you are better off the less you put in, both at once — and the board builds the room's own curve as it plays, round by round, which is the thing a final number cannot show you.

    Free ridingDominant strategiesRepeated games

  • Up to 600 people · About 10 min

    One lot, and the best loser sets the price

    One lot, one sealed number each, sold to the highest bid at or above the reserve — and the winner pays the SECOND-highest bid, or the reserve if that is higher, rather than their own. The room is told the price; each bidder is told privately what their own bid did. The debrief is the part that lands: your number decided whether you won and never what you paid, so no bid beats the honest one — which is exactly what stops being true the moment a winner pays their own.

    Second-price auctions

  • Up to 27 people · About 10 min

    Spend the neighbourhood fund

    £100,000 in the fund, £155,000 of schemes, and a price on every one of them where the room can see it while it ranks. The fund is spent straight down the room's combined order and the board draws the line where the money ran out. The lesson is in what is left in the pot: spending a fixed fund down a ranking is not the same operation as getting the most out of it, and the room's own ballot decides how many schemes end up standing.

    Budget constraintsPreference aggregation

  • In pairs · About 20 min · 2 acts

    Ten coins and nobody can stop you

    One of you holds ten coins and decides how many the other gets. They have no move at all — no accepting, no refusing, no comeback. Two rounds, and the room is re-dealt between them, so nobody ever decides about the person who decided about them. The room sees the whole distribution of what was given when nothing could be done about it and nothing could be bought with it.

    AltruismFairness norms

  • In pairs · About 45 min · 3 acts

    Twenty coins, take it or leave it

    One of you divides twenty coins; the other takes the split or refuses it — and refusing leaves BOTH of you with nothing. Three rounds against three people you will never play again. The room sees every offer it made, which ones died, and how many coins it destroyed to say no.

    Fairness normsCostly punishment

  • In pairs · About 30 min · 2 acts

    Send it and see what comes back

    Whatever you send your partner is multiplied on the way over, and then it is entirely theirs — nothing makes them send any of it back. Round one is trust with nothing behind it: nobody knows a thing about the person opposite. Round two changes three things at once — the sides, the multiplier, and the fact that you now know them — and the debrief says so, because a board that moved for three reasons cannot be read for one.

    Trust and reciprocityRepeated games

  • In pairs · About 20 min · 2 acts

    Two factories, one market, and the price you both set

    You and one rival make the identical crate and sell into the same demand, so the price is not yours to set — it is whatever the two of you produce between you. Make a lot and you sell a lot cheaply. The room sees where every market landed between what one seller alone would have made and what a price war would have, and what each of them earned for it.

    Imperfect competitionNash equilibrium

  • In pairs · About 25 min · 2 acts

    One of you builds the factory first

    One firm commits to its production and cannot take it back; the other sees that number and then decides. Nobody forced anybody — but committing to a large run leaves the follower nothing better than a small one, and the theory says that is worth exactly double. Played twice, with the sides swapped, so everybody gets to go first.

    First-mover advantageImperfect competition

  • Groups of 4 · About 19 min · 2 acts

    Four boats and a bay that belongs to nobody

    Four skippers work one bay, which stands about twelve strings of pots before it stops coming back. Shooting five strings beats shooting two every single time, whatever the other three do — and if all four shoot two, every boat lands twice what it lands when all four shoot five. One boat hauling costs the others nothing; the second takes it off every other boat, the two who worked steady included. Then it is played again, the year the bay does not come back.

    Common-pool resourcesExternalitiesDominant strategies

  • Up to 600 people · About 19 min · 2 acts

    What is a flat worth to you?

    Six identical flats, more people than flats, and everybody writes down the most they would pay. The six highest bids at or above the landlords' reserve are housed, and every one of them pays the best bid that MISSED OUT, or the reserve if that is higher. Then three become short-lets and the same room bids afresh for the other three. Held to the same bids, the rent could not have fallen: the best losing bid would come from higher up the room's own list. No winner chooses the rent, and the people scarcity costs most are the ones priced out of the market.

    Supply and demandPrice discovery

  • Groups of 3 · About 19 min · 2 acts

    Three cars on one forecourt

    You hold a good car, a fair one and a banger, and room on the forecourt for exactly one. The buyer is not being cheated — they genuinely value any car at half again what its owner does. They just cannot tell which is which, so they pay one price for the average of what is out there. Putting out your worst car beats putting out your best, every time, and an honest seller is paid an average that other people's bangers dragged down. Then the cars are inspected.

    Adverse selectionAsymmetric informationDominant strategies

  • Up to 600 people

    You are the market

    Students become buyers and sellers, read private value or cost cards and submit sealed offers. The room sees the curves those offers create; each phone identifies its own ordered step and trading outcome. Change the seller-cost schedule, collect fresh offers and compare both markets. Discuss how costs, choices and participation may explain the differences without assuming a direction of price change.

    Supply and demandPrice discovery

  • Up to 600 people · About 4 min

    Who really pays a tax?

    Buyers and sellers hold private value and cost cards, then submit one sealed set of orders. The room sees the demand and supply curves those orders make. Holding the orders fixed, compare a per-trade tax collected from sellers with the same tax collected from buyers: the posted price changes, but buyers pay the same all-in amount and sellers keep the same net amount whenever trade occurs. These are labeled hypothetical outcomes, not a second round of bids. Discuss what could change if people bid again under the tax.

    Supply and demandTax incidence

  • Up to 600 people · About 13 min

    Tenants and landlords

    Tenants and landlords hold private value and cost cards, submit sealed offers and see the market those orders create. A second market introduces a rent cap and collects fresh bids and asks while keeping the same cards. Compare rent, trades and any buyers turned away at the cap; each person sees their own accepted offer and outcome privately. Discuss whether the cap bound and how changed offers may also explain differences between the two markets.

    Supply and demandPrice controls

  • In pairs · 3 acts

    Ten days at the lemonade stand

    Pairs of students run a lemonade stand for ten days of summer, one student alone in an odd class: they set the price of a cup, then make the cups themselves, then decide whether a sign is worth £10. After each day the big screen plots every stand as a cup, price across and profit up, and the room draws a hill no stand could see alone before the pen inks the model's curve. On the rainy day the whole hill sinks below break-even. Counts and anonymous cups only; each phone sees its own stand's day, cash and place.

    Break-evenProfit maximisationDemand curves

  • Groups of 4 · 8 acts

    Steer the economy

    Students are dealt onto interest-rate committees as they join, each steering one country for eight years. Every member votes a rate each year, and the committee's rate is its middle vote. A labelled textbook model turns those rates into the country's unemployment and inflation, each rate biting a year later. As each year lands, every country moves at once on the big screen, and the oil shock pushes them all up and to the right. After year eight the model's long-run line is drawn at the natural rate, through the countries that bought jobs with cheap money. Each phone sees its own country only.

    Monetary policyInflation and unemployment

  • Up to 600 people · About 30 min · 2 acts

    Bank run: withdraw now or wait?

    One small bank: everyone has £100 in the same bank, which keeps cash for 3 in every 10 depositors and lends the rest out. On their phones, students choose to withdraw £100 today or wait for £110 next year. The big screen deals the answers onto a tally and ticks the vault's cash across the Withdraw lane: if more ask than it holds, the bank fails. Then deposit insurance arrives, the room chooses again, and ribbons show everyone who changed their answer, so the room sees whether insurance stopped the run. Every surface shows counts only.

    Bank runsDeposit insuranceCoordination problems

Every activity here ships with Decka — sign up free and add any of them to your library from the built-in classroom catalog.

How it works

  1. 01

    Add it to your library

    Sign up free and pull the activity from Decka's built-in classroom catalog — one click copies it into your own library, ready to run from Decka, PowerPoint or Google Slides.

  2. 02

    Students join by QR

    Everyone scans from the projector and plays in their phone's browser. No app, no account, nothing to install.

  3. 03

    You run the room

    You move the activity phase by phase: collection closes, the boards resolve on the big screen, and the debrief happens while the results are still up.

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