Game theory your class plays, not reads.

Every activity on this shelf is a strategic structure, not a skin: the dilemma has a dominant strategy and one bad equilibrium, chicken inverts it, the stag hunt turns the choice into a question about belief, and the battle of the sexes has two good answers that disagree. Students choose privately on their phones, the payoffs resolve on the projector, and the debrief happens while the room's own results are still on the board.

Prisoner's dilemma — two suspects, separate rooms

A practice run with fictional students. No real classroom or join code is created.

Try an answer on the phone. Lead the lesson from the screen.

On their phone

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Setting up the room…

  • In pairs · About 30 min · 2 acts

    Chicken — four seconds on a single-track lane

    Two cars closing on a lane with no passing place. Pull into the verge and the whole depot hears about it in the morning; hold the middle and hope they don't. Backing down is the worst thing that can happen to you — right up until neither of you does, which is the worst thing that can happen to either. Played twice, the second time with somebody in the passenger seat.

    Anti-coordinationNash equilibriumMixed strategies

  • In pairs · About 30 min · 2 acts

    The stag hunt — one day, two ways to spend it

    A stag needs both of you on the ridge all day and the share that comes home is five suppers. A hare is three, it is yours alone, and you can take one at any point in the day. Neither choice is right by itself: what you should do depends entirely on what you think the person beside you is about to do. Played twice, the second time when being the one who stayed actually costs you four suppers out of an empty larder.

    Coordination problemsRisk dominanceNash equilibrium

  • In pairs · About 30 min · 2 acts

    Battle of the sexes — one evening, two plans

    One free evening, two plans, and no way to reach each other before you set off. You would both rather be at the other's thing together than at your own alone — so there are two ways tonight works, you each prefer a different one, and the two of you politely deferring ends exactly as badly as both of you digging in.

    Coordination problemsNash equilibrium

  • In pairs · About 30 min · 2 acts

    Rock, paper, scissors — two rivals and a contract

    Two rivals, twelve weeks of work. There is nothing safe to throw: whatever you would always play, the person opposite can beat. The board shows what this room actually threw, and then the room throws again having read it — which is the lesson, because a pattern anybody can see is a pattern anybody can beat.

    Zero-sum gamesMixed strategiesNash equilibrium

  • Up to 600 people · About 11 min

    Ten rounds in the pot

    Ten tokens, ten times. A token you keep is worth one to you; a token in the pot is worth half a token to every single person in the room. The pot is better off the more goes in and you are better off the less you put in, both at once — and the board builds the room's own curve as it plays, round by round, which is the thing a final number cannot show you.

    Free ridingDominant strategiesRepeated games

  • In pairs · About 40 min

    Three rounds, three partners

    Split ten coins or take them all, three times, against somebody you have not played yet.

    Repeated games

  • In pairs · About 45 min · 3 acts

    Twenty coins, take it or leave it

    One of you divides twenty coins; the other takes the split or refuses it — and refusing leaves BOTH of you with nothing. Three rounds against three people you will never play again. The room sees every offer it made, which ones died, and how many coins it destroyed to say no.

    Fairness normsCostly punishment

  • In pairs · About 30 min · 2 acts

    Send it and see what comes back

    Whatever you send your partner is multiplied on the way over, and then it is entirely theirs — nothing makes them send any of it back. Round one is trust with nothing behind it: nobody knows a thing about the person opposite. Round two changes three things at once — the sides, the multiplier, and the fact that you now know them — and the debrief says so, because a board that moved for three reasons cannot be read for one.

    Trust and reciprocityRepeated games

  • In pairs · About 20 min · 2 acts

    Two factories, one market, and the price you both set

    You and one rival make the identical crate and sell into the same demand, so the price is not yours to set — it is whatever the two of you produce between you. Make a lot and you sell a lot cheaply. The room sees where every market landed between what one seller alone would have made and what a price war would have, and what each of them earned for it.

    Imperfect competitionNash equilibrium

  • In pairs · About 25 min · 2 acts

    One of you builds the factory first

    One firm commits to its production and cannot take it back; the other sees that number and then decides. Nobody forced anybody — but committing to a large run leaves the follower nothing better than a small one, and the theory says that is worth exactly double. Played twice, with the sides swapped, so everybody gets to go first.

    First-mover advantageImperfect competition

  • Groups of 4 · About 19 min · 2 acts

    Four boats and a bay that belongs to nobody

    Four skippers work one bay, which stands about twelve strings of pots before it stops coming back. Shooting five strings beats shooting two every single time, whatever the other three do — and if all four shoot two, every boat lands twice what it lands when all four shoot five. One boat hauling costs the others nothing; the second takes it off every other boat, the two who worked steady included. Then it is played again, the year the bay does not come back.

    Common-pool resourcesExternalitiesDominant strategies

  • Groups of 3 · About 19 min · 2 acts

    Three cars on one forecourt

    You hold a good car, a fair one and a banger, and room on the forecourt for exactly one. The buyer is not being cheated — they genuinely value any car at half again what its owner does. They just cannot tell which is which, so they pay one price for the average of what is out there. Putting out your worst car beats putting out your best, every time, and an honest seller is paid an average that other people's bangers dragged down. Then the cars are inspected.

    Adverse selectionAsymmetric informationDominant strategies

  • In pairs · About 30 min · 2 acts

    Matching pennies — the game where you want opposite things

    One penny each, one call each, at the same moment. One of you takes the pair when the two calls agree and the other takes it when they differ — so for the first time in this catalog the person opposite you is not playing your game, they are playing its mirror. There is nothing safe to call: whatever you would always say, they can price. Called twice, the second time with the room's own record of how it called.

    Zero-sum gamesMixed strategiesNash equilibrium

  • In pairs · 2 acts

    Don't take the last coin

    Pairs play the twenty-one game on their phones, quick game after quick game: take one, two or three coins, and whoever takes the last coin loses. The big screen drops each finished game into a tray for the player who moved first or second, then lays every turn on a strip by the coins its mover faced, and the traps sink. The pen works back from the last coin, the room says which seat it would rather take from twenty-two, and plays again. Counts only; each phone sees its own games.

    Backward inductionSequential games

  • In pairs · About 40 min · 2 acts

    Hawk-dove game: fight or share

    Two gulls, one fish: students play the hawk-dove game in pairs on their phones. Play hawk and fight for the fish, or dove and share it; losing a fight costs 20. The big screen deals how many fought onto a tally beside a two-by-two of where the pairs ended up, and rings the two equilibria. Then nesting season doubles the cost of losing, the room plays again, and ribbons show every bird that changed its choice, so the room sees whether dearer fights thinned the hawks. The screen shows counts only; each phone sees its own result.

    Evolutionarily stable strategiesNash equilibriumMixed strategies

  • In pairs · About 30 min · 2 acts

    Schelling point: meet me in the city

    Meet me at noon: students are paired with a stranger they cannot talk to, and on their phones each picks one of six places in the city to wait. If both pick the same place, they meet and each scores 5 points. The big screen deals where the room waited onto six bins beside a six-by-six of who found whom, and rings all six matching squares as equilibria, identically: nothing in the payoffs picks a place, yet the room picks one. Then the same pairs try again, having seen where the room waited. The screen shows counts only; each phone sees its own result.

    Focal pointsCoordination problemsNash equilibrium

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How it works

  1. 01

    Add it to your library

    Sign up free and pull the activity from Decka's built-in classroom catalog — one click copies it into your own library, ready to run from Decka, PowerPoint or Google Slides.

  2. 02

    Students join by QR

    Everyone scans from the projector and plays in their phone's browser. No app, no account, nothing to install.

  3. 03

    You run the room

    You move the activity phase by phase: collection closes, the boards resolve on the big screen, and the debrief happens while the results are still up.

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